I won't call it NGINX2Root if it requires a vuln published a quarter ago (the SCTP one, probably CVE-2026-64564) to gain root.
In this case it's an RCE, so... some NGINX2Shell?
The good thing is, Xint, thank you for doing responsible disclosure this time! I won't say https://copy.fail is responsible given the website was released before many distros have fixed the issue.
Edit: So there's another unreleased SCTP vulnerability? Well, maybe it's time to turn it off if it's not used...
> Does patching nginx close the whole chain?
> It closes the way in through nginx. The kernel bug is a separate local privilege escalation vulnerability and needs its own patch, which will be released in the coming weeks.
I really dislike a brand new vibe-coded website claiming five vulns and "responsible disclosure" without an actual fix already available on https://nginx.org/
The most useful line on the page for operators is easy to miss: after updating, `nginx -s reload` does not load the new binary, you need a restart. I'd expect a fair number of hosts to be "patched" on disk and still running the old worker for weeks.
The other one is the caveat about version strings. Distro packages and container images backport fixes without changing the version, so `nginx -v` can't confirm exposure or safety by itself. For anyone pinning an image tag like nginx:1.27-alpine, the question is whether that tag was rebuilt, and the only way to know is to pull again and compare digests.
On the 98.9% figure: the page is careful to call it version prevalence, which I appreciate. But the fourth condition in your checklist, external h2 negotiation, is measurable from outside with an ALPN probe. Did you run that against the same Shodan set? The share of affected-version hosts that actually negotiate h2 on a public port would be a much better estimate of real exposure.
I checked my own small server after reading this and it turned out not to matter, since the proxy in front is Caddy. What it did show me is that I couldn't have answered "which proxy, which version, is h2 on" from memory, and that's probably the common case for small deployments.
Rendered at 17:44:42 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) with Vercel.
Also, Xint, if you are using SCTPhantom, you don't "discover" the SCTP vuln, you "reproduce" the SCTP vuln; Tencent discovered the SCTP vuln: https://matrix.tencent.com/en/2026/08/06/sctphantom-CVE-2026...
The good thing is, Xint, thank you for doing responsible disclosure this time! I won't say https://copy.fail is responsible given the website was released before many distros have fixed the issue.
Edit: So there's another unreleased SCTP vulnerability? Well, maybe it's time to turn it off if it's not used...
> Does patching nginx close the whole chain?
> It closes the way in through nginx. The kernel bug is a separate local privilege escalation vulnerability and needs its own patch, which will be released in the coming weeks.
Pre-auth RCE in Nginx HTTP/2 handling
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50547374
Responsible my ass
Wiz write-up: https://www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-http2-rce-vulnerabilities
The other one is the caveat about version strings. Distro packages and container images backport fixes without changing the version, so `nginx -v` can't confirm exposure or safety by itself. For anyone pinning an image tag like nginx:1.27-alpine, the question is whether that tag was rebuilt, and the only way to know is to pull again and compare digests.
On the 98.9% figure: the page is careful to call it version prevalence, which I appreciate. But the fourth condition in your checklist, external h2 negotiation, is measurable from outside with an ALPN probe. Did you run that against the same Shodan set? The share of affected-version hosts that actually negotiate h2 on a public port would be a much better estimate of real exposure.
I checked my own small server after reading this and it turned out not to matter, since the proxy in front is Caddy. What it did show me is that I couldn't have answered "which proxy, which version, is h2 on" from memory, and that's probably the common case for small deployments.